NSC review completed.



THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

3 March 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT

: NSSD 1-82

- 1. Attached is the current draft of Parts I and II of the proposed National Security Strategy document and an outline of Part III which has been prepared by the NSC Staff. Part I is a good statement, but so short and abstract that it suppresses rather than highlights the hard choices we face among the various objectives stated. Part III on the military component, whose preparation has largely been assigned to the DoD, will be more detailed and it could be a vehicle for arguing about the hard choices and their implications for defense policies and programs. Some of this is going on in the Pentagon now, for instance on the size and mission of the RDJTF vs. the Navy in connection with Persian Gulf contingencies, but it's not clear how such disputes will be surfaced through the NSSD 1-82 process to the NSC. I will discuss this question with Tom Reed and Fred Ikle and will report to you when I have done so. (Top Secret)
- 2. Our assigned responsibility is for the threat section of Part III. and I have agreed that we will draft this section and coordinate it with him. (Top Secret)

Henry S. Rowen Chairman

Attachments Parts I, II & III

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SUBJECT: NSSD 1-82 (TS-823160)

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raft of NSSD 1-82, Parts and II

U.S. National Security Strategy

Part I

National Objectives and the International Environment

Broad Purposes of U.S. National Security Policy

The national security policy of the United States shall serve the following broad purposes:

- To preserve the political identity and institutions of the United States as embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. (TS)
- To protect the United States its national territory, citizenry, military forces, and assets abroad from military, paramilitary, or terrorist attack. (TS)
- To foster the economic well-being of the United States, in particular, by maintaining and strengthening the nation's industrial and technological base and by ensuring access to foreign markets and resources. (TS)
- To foster an international order supportive of the vital interests of the United States by maintaining and strengthening the nation's alliances and by promoting freedom, justice, and economic development throughout the world. (TS)

The International Environment

United States national security policy will be guided by the following assessment of the current international situation and of trends and prospective developments affecting the pursuit of our broad objectives. (TS)

The decade of the 1980s will pose the greatest challenge to the survival and well-being of the nation since World War II. The Soviet Union is and will remain for the foreseeable future the most formidable threat to the United States and to American interests globally. The growth of Soviet military power over the last decade has called into question the ability of the United States and its allies to deter attack by the Soviet Union and its allies across the spectrum of conflict. (TS)

Review on March 2, 2002

Classified & Extended by William P.-Clark
Reason for Extension: NSC-1.13(e)

The loss of U.S. nuclear superiority coupled with the expansion of Soviet conventional capabilities has increased the relative importance of U.S. and allied conventional capabilities; increased the likelihood that a direct conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union would be a long global war and heightens the need for a substantial U.S. industrial base for mobilization. (TS)

Building on their strengthened military position, the Soviets have developed a comprehensive and sophisticated political/military strategy combining selective use of their own and proxy military and security forces, arms sales and grants, manipulation of terrorist and subversive organizations, diplomatic and arms control initiatives, and propaganda and disinformation activities. The near-term objectives of this strategy are to extend Soviet influence in strategic regions of the Third World, and to divide the United States from its major allies. (TS)

At the same time, the Soviets-will-continue to have important vulnerabilities. The economies of the Soviet Union and of most Soviet allies continue to exhibit serious structural weaknesses; the appeal of Communist ideologies appears to be decreasing throughout much of the world, including the Soviet bloc itself; the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan has revealed some of the limitations on the effectiveness of Soviet power projection capabilities, and provides important opportunities for political gains; events in Poland have underlined, and could contribute further to, the internal political weakness of most warsaw Pact countries. (TS)

In the Middle East, the chronic instability of the region both within and among states, including the Arab-Israel conflict, the rise of militant nationalist and religious movements, together with an expanded Soviet presence, poses a critical threat to Western economic and security interests. (TS)

The People's Republic of China remains hostile to the Soviet Union and its Vietnamese client, and appears to have begun an ideological evolution away from Soviet-style Communism; as such, it is an important source of support for United States global policy toward the Soviet Union. At the same time, taking account of the uncertainties of its domestic politics and the possibility of realignment with the USSR, the PRC must also be regarded as a potential long-term threat to the interests of the U.S. and its allies in Asia. (TS)

In the Third World, deteriorating economic, social and political circumstances in many countries, together with the continuing erosion of international legal and moral constraints on the use and threat of military force, will lead to increasing instability and conflicts and multiply opportunities for the extension of Soviet influence. (TS)

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Acceleration of efforts by several nations to acquire nuclear weapons threatens the viability of the international non-proliferation regime, with potentially serious consequences for regional stability as well as for the security of the United States. (TS)

The readiness of our major allies to expand their military programs significantly and to rethink political and military strategies in the light of the increasing Soviet threat are limited by economic requirements, domestic political conditions and differing views of the nature and objectives of the adversary. However, the economic strength and shared interests and values of the nations within the Western alliance are an asset of great importance if effectively mobilized. (TS)

Objectives of U.S. National Security Policy

The national security policy of the United States will be guided by the following objectives globally:

- To deter military attack by the USSR and its allies against the U.S., its allies, and key third countries across the spectrum of conflict, to defeat such attack should deterrence fail, and to neutralize Soviet efforts to intimidate or coerce the U.S. or others through its military power. (TS)
- To extend the influence of the U.S. throughout the world by strengthening existing alliances, by forming and supporting coalitions of states friendly to Western interests, by selective diplomatic and economic initiatives, and by expanded political action and information efforts. (TS)
- To contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world, and to increase the costs of Soviet support and use of proxy, terrorist, and subversive forces. (TS)
- To neutralize the efforts of the USSR to increase its influence through diplomacy, arms transfers, economic pressure, political action, propaganda, and disinformation (TS
- To place constraints on Soviet military spending, discourage
 ...Soviet adventurism, and weaken the Soviet alliance system
 by forcing the USSR to bear the brunt of its economic
 shortcomings and those of its allies, and by encouraging
 long-term liberalizing and nationalist tendencies within
 the Soviet Union and allied countries. (TS)

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To limit the growth of, and where possible, to reduce Soviet military capabilities by demonstrating the sustained commitment of the U.S. to increase its military strength, pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control agreements that limit Soviet power, and preventing the flow of militarily significant technologies and resources to the Soviet Union.

To ensure the U.S. access to foreign markets, and to ensure the U.S. and its allies access to foreign energy and mineral resources. (TS)

- To ensure unimpeded U.S. access to space and the oceans.
- To discourage further proliferation of nuclear weapons. (TS)
 - To encourage economic development and the growth of humane social and political orders in the Third World (TS)

In addition to the foregoing, U.S. national security policy will be guided by the following operational objectives in specific regions:

In Europe, to preserve the NATO alliance, while strengthening NATO capabilities and adjusting NATO strategy as necessary to deter and defeat the threat posed by dramatically improved Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces; to counter West European political trends that inhibit effective U.S. and allied action in this direction; to encourage the NATO allies to provide support for Western objectives in other regions, particularly Southwest Asia; to strengthen the independence of key neutral states; to increase the costs of Soviet repression of popular forces and institutions in Poland and other East European countries; to obtain West European assistance in raising the political and economic costs to the Soviet Union of its failure to adhere to internationally accepted standards of conduct. (TS)

In the Western Hemisphere, to blunt and contain the projection of Soviet and Cuban military power and influence in the Caribbean Basin and South America; to discourage the USSR from using Cuba as a base for mounting a strategic threat to the security of the hemisphere; to strengthen U.S. political and military relationships with key countries. (TS)

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- In Africa, to defeat Libyan-sponsored subversive and terrorist activities; to secure the withdrawal or increase the costs of Soviet and Soviet proxy forces on the continent; to ensure U.S. and allied access to strategically important mineral resources, while avoiding close association with the Republic of South Africa; to establish a U.S. presence supportive of Western interests on the continent and adjacent areas. (TS)
- In Asia, to preserve our existing alliances and our current relationship with Taiwan; to encourage Japan to increase substantially its military capabilities to better meet the increased Soviet threat in East Asia and to resist Soviet intimidation; to deter aggression by North Korea and Vietnam, and to secure the withdrawal or increase the costs of the Vietnamese presence in Laos and Kampuchea; to preserve the Sino-Soviet split, encourage the ideological and political evolution of the PRC in a direction compatible with Western interests, and strengthen the capability of the PRC to resist Soviet invasion and intimidation, while at the same time limiting its ability to threaten the U.S. and its Asian allies over the long term. (TS)
- In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, to ensure Western access to Persian Gulf oil; to preserve the independence of key states in the region and strengthen their ability to resist aggression or subversion by a regional or extra-regional power or movement; to enhance the possibility of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict in a manner that respects the security interests of all parties; to secure the withdrawal or increase the costs of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan; to deter or frustrate further military intervention or subversion by the Soviet Union, Soviet proxies, or regional states or movements hostile to Western interests. (TS)

Part II

Implementing Strategies

The overall national objectives of the United States are to be implemented through an interlocking set of strategies that principally include the following:

- -- diplomatic;
- -- information;
- -- economic;
 - military.

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The full articulation of U.S. National Strategy requires the development and integration of each set of strategies into a comprehensive whole. The various instruments of U.S. national power and the strategies for their use do not stand alone; rather, they are inextricably linked and, to be effective, must be mutually supportive. Part I of this study provides the common starting point towards this end.

The overall study process will build upon this common starting point by means of individual study segments. Part III of this study will consider the military component only. The other components of U.S. national strategy as outlined above will be the subject of companion studies to be undertaken on an expeditious basis in the near future. Additional studies will also be undertaken concerning the role of intelligence, covert operations, and arms control in supporting the implementing strategies.

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Part III

Military Component of US National Security Strategy

Section A: Impact of military threats on US National Security Strategy

Purpose and Scope: To assess the impact of existing and projected military threats on the ability of the United States to execute successfully its national security strategy. The appraisal will include Soviet military power, the Soviet bloc, Soviet surrogates, and other military threats to US national security interests.

Outline. This section should include both current and projected military capabilities and influence of Soviet, Soviet bloc, surrogate and other states and forces. Specific issues to be addressed should include:

° Sovi		et military power and the soviet bloc		20/(1
		Objectives		25X1
		Doctrine		
		Strategy		
·		Forces		25 X 1
		Military Assistance Progra	ms	
•	• Other military threats			
		Surrogate forces		
		Terrorism		
		Others		
Section	<u>B</u> :	Role of Allies and Others		,

Purpose and Scope: To assess the degree to which the United States can rely on support from other countries. The appraisal should examine the national security interests of our Allies and friends with those of the United States, determine areas of compatibility, and assess resulting implications for the allocation of US defense resources.

Outline: This section should consider national interests and objectives, economic and political imperatives, and military capabilities. Specific issues to be addressed should include:

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- Burden-sharing: By whom, how much, in what areas?
- Basing and access: Implications for US projection of power
- Host nation support: Prospects in the year ahead
- Alliances and security cooperation: Effect of compatible and divergent interests on coalition building and a strategic division of labor.
- o The case of the PRC.

Section C: Regional Military Objectives

Purpose and Scope: To identify regional military objectives. Based upon the broader regional objectives contained in part I, this section will develop those military objectives necessary to provide focus for operational strategies (both current and projected).

Outline: Region-by-region analysis.

Section D: Strategic and Other Nuclear Forces

Purpose and Scope: To establish hational-level nuclear force objectives, policies, and strategies. Building on existing Administration policy, this section will examine force application and force development aspects of our strategic TRIAD and other nuclear forces. Where existing and programmed capabilities are insufficient to achieve required objective conditions, the impact of resource limitations will be assessed and priorities established.

Outline:

- Force application: (the use of nuclear forces in peacetime and war to achieve specific political objectives)
 - °° Strategic Forces
 - -- Strategic nuclear objectives
 - -- Strategic nuclear policies: deterrence, linkage to Alliance strategies, warfighting, conflict termination.
 - -- Nuclear strategy: targeting policy, nature of counterforce capability, strategic defense, continuity of government, secure reserve force, level of required assured destruction capability, crisis stability, recovery capability.

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- oo Other Nuclear Forces
- -- objectives
- -- policies
- -- strategies
- Force development
 - °° Strategic Forces
 - -- Force development objectives.
 - Force development policies: modernization, readiness, C³I, R&D, role of Allies, continuity of government, early warning, space.
 - -- Force development strategy: priorities, connectivity, discreteness of options, day-to-day generation standards.
 - °° Other Nuclear Forces
 - -- objectives
 - -- policies
 - -- strategies
- Arms Control Considerations: roles and principles

Section E: Non-Nuclear Forces

Purpose and Scope: To establish national-level objectives, policies and strategies for all US military forces, exclusive of nuclear forces, required to achieve both regional and national objectives during peacetime and in the event of war. Where existing and programmed capabilities are insufficient to achieve required objective conditions, the impact of resource limitations will be assessed and priorities established.

Outline: This section is intended to provide focus for operational strategies (both day-to-day and contingency) and to serve as a basis for the determination of required and interim force levels and characteristics.

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- Force application
 - -- Objectives
 - -- <u>Policies</u> (regional priorities and extra-regional linkages, forward deployments, crisis management, command and control, and special operations)
 - -- Strategy: peacetime (presence, infrastructure development, priority of effort, levels of reliance on Allies and friends); wartime (priorities, phasing, desired outcomes, coalition strategy); special operations (counterterrorism, support to low intensity conflicts)
- Force development
 - -- Objectives
 - Policies: to include priorities, role of reserve forces, mobilization, industrial base, sustainability, force structure, force expansion, reinforcement, strategic mobility, readiness, modernization, RSI.
 - -- Strategy: development of procurement strategy, risk assessments with procurement adjustments, force allocation strategy.
- Arms Control considerations: roles and principles

Section F: Force Integration

Purpose and Scope: To outline employment concepts, doctrine and procedures so that all types of forces are integrated in a synergistic manner and support overall political objectives as their basic rationale. This section will identify specific issues which must be addressed in order to ensure successful force integration and will examine integration issues vertically (strategic forces through unconventional warfare forces) and horizontally (across services).

Outline

- 1. Concepts of integration
 - a. Current national guidance
 - b. Unified Commands

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- 2. Issues
 - a. C^3I
 - b. Operational trade-offs between various types of forces--where should we be placing our emphasis
 - c. Organization of budget documents and other administrative aspects needed to ensure force integration

Section G: Security Assistance

Purpose and Scope: To determine the role of the security assistance program in the US national security strategy. The study should include regional perspectives, but individual country assessments are beyond the scope of this study.

Outline: This section will analyze security assistance in terms of its contribution to US national security strategy and will propose specific actions, in priority order, that could be taken to make the program more effective in worldwide and regional terms.

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Review February 23, 2002

Classified & Extended by William P. Clark TOD OFFICE Reason for Extension: NSC Approved For Release 2009/04/02 CIA-RDF

NSSD 1-82 STUDY PLAN

Segment	Sub-Working Gp Chair/Vice-Chair	Lead Agency Chair/Vice-Chair	Rev:			ssue olutión
Part I National Objectives/ International Environment	NSC Staff C. Lord	NSC Staff C. Lord	Mar	5	Mar	8 .
Part II Implementing Strategies	NSC Staff C. Lord	NSC Staff C. Lord	Mar	5	Mar	8
Part III Military Component of U.S. National Security Strategy	DOD Dr. Ikle/A. Myer	olb.				
Section A: Impact of military threats	Rou	CIA/DOD / <u>~</u> /BG Goodman/M. Berta	Mar	13	Mar	23
Section B: Role of Allies and others		State J. Dobbins//J. Rentschler	Mar	13	Mar	23
Section C: Regional military objectives		DOD D. Shilling/C. Shoemaker	Mar	13	Mar	23
Section D: Strategic and other nuclear forces		DOD R. Lehman/R. Linhard	Apr	2	Apr	7
Section E: Non-nuclear forces	west /	/DOD VADM Bigley/A. Myer	Apr	2	Apr	⁷
Section Force Integration	D. Z	DOD akheim/LTG Gorman/C. Shoemake	Apr r	2	Apr	7
Section &: Security Assistance	Beers	State L. Brown/R. Kimmitt	Apr	2	Apr	7
NSC Meeting	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	••••••	Apr	15		

NSSD 1-82 MILESTONE SCHEDULE

·	
February 18	Initial Interagency Review Group Meeting
February 23	Advise Chairman of Sub-Group chairs, comment on Schedule
February 19-26	Review of outline (Parts I-III), development of work plans
February 26	Interagency Review Group Meeting: Discussion of Part I, Approval of Outline, Parts II-III, discussion of work plans
February 26-March 5	Preparation and submission of Part I issue papers
March 5	Interagency Review Group Meeting: Discussion of Part I issues
March 5-8	Resolution of issues, Part I
February 26-March 13	Drafting of Study segments, Part III, Sections A, B, C; Preparation and submission of issue papers
March 13	Interagency Review Group Meeting: Discussion of Part III, Sections A, B, C
March 15-23	Resolution of issues, Part III, Sections A, B,
February 26-April 2	Drafting of Study segments, Part III, Sections D-G; Preparation and submission of issue papers
April 2	Interagency Review Group Meeting: Discussion of Part III, Sections D-G
April 3-7	Resolution of Issues, Part III, Sections D-G
April 7-12	Preparation of NSC issue papers
April 15	NSC Meeting: Consideration of issues

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- In Africa, to defeat Libyan-sponsored subversive and terrorist activities; to eliminate or increase the costs of the Soviet/Cuban presence in Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique; to establish a US presence supportive of Western interests in the Middle East and Southwest Asia;
- In Asia, to preserve our existing alliances, while substantially strengthening Japan's self-defense capabilities to meet the threat posed by improved Soviet forces in the Far East and the increased Soviet presence in Southeast Asia; to deter aggression by North Korea and Vietnam and eliminate or increase the costs of the Vietnamese presence in Laos and Kampuchea; to preserve and deepen the Sino-Soviet split and strengthen the PRC's capability to resist Soviet invasion, while at the same time minimizing its ability to threaten the US and its allies over the long term;
- In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, to ensure Western access to Persian Gulf oil; to preserve the independence of all states in the region and strengthen their ability to resist aggression or subversion by a regional or extra-regional power or movement; to eliminate the Soviet presence in Afghanistan or increase its costs to the USSR.

Part II

Implementing Strategies

The overall national objectives of the United States are to be implemented through an interlocking set of strategies that

- diplomatic;
- information;
- economic;
- military.

The full articulation of US National Strategy requires the development and integration of each set of strategies into a comprehensive whole. The various instruments of US national power and the strategies for their use do not stand alone; rather, they are inextricably linked and, to be effective, must be mutually supportive. Part I of this study provides the

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Revised February 24, 1982